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The Cold War, characterized by its bipolar ideological 
rivalry, did not resolve centuries-old hostilities between the 
West and Russia. In order to regain the lost influence and 
reincarnation of regional hegemony, President Putin wanted a 
casus-belli. The international humanitarian intervention in 
Kosovo and the latter’s declaration of independence were 
Russia’s weak justifications for resuming the old clashes. 
Interventions in the territories of the former Soviet Union 
inhabited by Russian speakers, the annexation of Crimea, and 
direct involvement in the interethnic disputes in the eastern 
part of Ukraine and the Syrian wars show that Russia is 
determined to challenge and test the Western commitment to 
the spread of democracy. The similarities between Kosovo and 
Crimea, loudly echoed by Russia and their supporters, cannot 
be academically binding, except in some aspects of tertiary 
nature.  
The brutal prevention of Chechnya’s independence in the 
1990s and failure to recognize Kosovo while applauding the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia present Putin’s 
political inconsistency and Real politic orientation. The Russian 
annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, and threats to destabilize 
countries that “do not respect” the rights and interests of 
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The article aims to analyze the volatility of Russian foreign policy by 
comparing the case of Kosovo’s independence to the annexation of Crimea 
and Russia’s paternalist intentions abroad.  
  
Key Words: Kosovo, Crimea, Similarities, Paradigm of Belonging, 
Paternalism 
 
1. Introduction  
 
President Vladimir Putin is set on strengthening Russia and reclaiming 
its role as a world power. He intends to reach his goal by threatening to cut 
supplies of natural resources and making military advances through 
annexations of the neo-czarist type. At the end of World War II, Russia’s 
geopolitical influence had spread further even at the heart of Europe, in the 
lands of Germany. The end of Cold War pushed the Russian Federation 
through a painful disintegration and transition, which failed to bring real 
democracy, because the new Russia within a decade, with Vladimir Putin 
as its leader, became once again a centralized state. By rectifying the 
failures of previous leaders, Russia is seeking to return, if not at the top, to 
the group of powerful states, aiming to uproot the post-Cold War order 
already established in Europe(Diehl, 2014). Russian awareness of the 
declining diplomatic, economic, and political reputation during the Cold 
War and the collapse “of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster 
of the century”(Putin, 2005). To this day, it arouses nationalist feelings, 
making regional influence the cornerstone of modern Russian foreign 
policy. Putin “clearly regards his hybrid war as payback for Russia’s defeat 
in the Cold War” (Saakashvili, 2015). 
States that emerged from the Soviet Union, and especially Ukraine’s 
unprecedented degree of independence gained at the end of the Cold War, 
were not seen with good eyes by Russian former communists and 
nationalists. Involvement in territories inhabited by Russian speakers in the 
former Soviet states, the annexation of Crimea, and interethnic disputes in 
the eastern part of Ukraine are signs that Russia is determined to challenge 
the Western democratic peace efforts among Russia’s neighborhood. 
“Understanding [Putin’s] motives for occupying and annexing Crimea is 
crucial to assessing whether he will make similar choices in the future—for 
example, sending troops to 'liberate' ethnic Russians in the Baltic states—
just as it is key to determining what measures the West might take to deter 
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such actions” (Treisman, 2016).” Besides that, Russia–West rivalries are 
shifting toward the Middle East, overshadowing the Ukrainian case and 
dealing with ISIS, which is fighting against the interests of the both, the 
West and East, and finally against the Arab World. In such circumstances, 
Kremlin is looking forward to strengthening and widening its geopolitical 
orbit of influence.  
The Russian Federation uses all possibilities to hinder EU enlargement 
and NATO’s expansion towards East and South East Europe by 
destabilizing the region and supporting autocratic governments. In “An 
Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern 
Europe,” intellectuals and former CEE policymakers note that Russia 
“increasingly acts as a revisionist [nation …] pursuing a 19th-century 
agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods” (Open Letter, 2009). 
Intervening in the Caucasus, supporting secessionist movement, and 
recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states on 26 
August 2008 are diplomatic maneuvers aimed at increasing Russian 
influence in international relations. Raising the issue of these two Georgian 
regions, Russian diplomacy is attempting to negatively influence the 
Kosovo integration processes. These tendencies have been loudly echoed 
by Russia putting at the center of justification the similarities between 
Kosovo and Crimea. It was not unintentional. Pursuing the cause for future 
policy of interventionism, to correct the political and territorial loses after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the casus belli was found in “the Kosovo 
precedent,” a hotspot of division between the West and Russia for almost 
two decades. There is no academic argument that may compare the case of 
Kosovo with Crimea, except on some third-hand similarities. Kosovo was 
only a pretext; Russia’s actual concern were three projects of military, 
economic, and political nature: NATO’s enlargement with Ukraine as a 
potential member, Ukraine’s customs union with EU, and the country’s EU 
membership aspiration. 
Paragraph 88 of the Russian presentation to the International Court of 
Justice on the issue of the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence 
(a case initiated by Serbia) speaks about the legal conditions in which 
Kosovo allegedly seceded: 
“The Russian Federation is of the view that [international law] may 
be construed as authorizing secession under certain conditions. 
However, those conditions should be limited to truly extreme 
circumstances, such as an outright attack by the parent State, 
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threatening the very existence of the people in question. Otherwise, 
all efforts should be taken in order to settle the tension between the 
parent State and the ethnic community concerned within the 
framework of the existing State.” (Stepanowa, 2014). 
 
Regarding Crimea, no efforts were made by Russian policy-makers “to 
settle the existing tensions” between Crimean Russians and the Ukrainian 
government, except for threats to cut-off gas supplies. There was not a call 
for international mediation between Ukraine and Russia to address 
disputes. There was not even an effort or call to conciliate “disputes” 
because they did not exist! (Putin, 2014). In the absence of international 
involvement in solving the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, Russian hegemonic 
and unilateralist behavior could not bring projected aims. According to 
Russian leader, “a precedent our western colleagues created with their own 
hands in a very similar situation, when they agreed that the unilateral 
separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is doing now, was 
legitimate and did not require any permission from the country’s central 
authorities.”(Putin, 2014).1 In this direction, Russian foreign minister, 
Sergey Lavrov, in a visit to Belgrade said that “there are absurd efforts of 
those who managed the secession of Kosovo from Serbia without any 
referendum questioning the expressed will of the citizens of Crimea to join 
Russia” (Telegrafi, 2015). 
Kosovo declared independence after decades of sufferings and all kinds 
of state atrocities, culminating in acts of genocide such as the mass murder 
and expulsion of targeted Albanian population from the territory. Russia 
annexed Crimea without an excuse, except the fact that ethnic Russians are 
                                                 
1 Address by the President of Russian Federation, 18 March 2014. Otherwise, the Crimea 
was annexed by the Russian tsarist empire in 1783, ten years after the defeat of the 
Ottomans, to be transferred to Ukraine on January 25, 1954, "as a natural consequence of 
proximity territorial Crimes Ukraine, their economy and agricultural commonalities and 
close cultural ties between the province' of Crimea and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic. "Meeting minutes from Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet” during which 
the transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine was approved. Meeting of the Presidium of 
the USSR Supreme Soviet, 19 February 1954, Crimea is dominated by Russian population 
with about 75% as the result of the policy of cleansing non-Russians, mainly Tatars, by 
Stalin sending them in areas of Siberia. Since then, Crimea Autonomous Republic was 
transformed into an autonomous province within Ukraine until the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union (1991), when advances in Autonomous Republic with referendum held and 
approved by the Parliament of Ukraine. 
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in greater numbers in that part Ukraine, as a result of the expulsion of 
Tatars and others, and the unsuitable characterization of the “holiness” of 
the territory for Russia, comparing the importance of Crimea for Russia to 
the worth of Jerusalem for Jews and Arabs (Putin, 2014). According to this 
logic—“wherever Russians live, there is also Russian sovereignty”— the 
same fate would follow other territories in the region. Why then, the non-
Russian peoples living within Russia do not have the right to be free from 
Russia domination? Why thousands of Chechens and Tatars were killed 
and not offered the right to live independently from Russia? Recently, 
April 2016, Russia has officially banned the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar 
people in Crimea – Majlis. (B92, 2016). Crimeans were advised to hold a 
referendum, plagued by euphoria, fraud, and intimidation, on unification 
with Russia and without dialogue efforts to resolve the question of ethnic 
Russians in Ukraine. Kosovars did not aspire to unite with Albania or any 
other state. Kosovo held a referendum in 1991, but the West recognized 
Kosovo’s independence only after tremendous suffering of Albanians by 
the Serbian regime, after a process of exhaustive international mediation (in 
which Russia had participated), after having exhausted all diplomatic 
means, and after the humanitarian intervention of NATO forces.2  
Crimea’s annexation and Russia’s intervention in eastern Ukraine, 
although Russians deny this, are imperialist actions based on the realistic 
behavior premises: “I do my work, and then talk.” “What apparently 
triggered Russian efforts to destabilize the interim Ukrainian government 
after former President Victor Yanukovych, fled in February [2014], was the 
interim government’s affirmation of its desire to draw closer to the 
European Union and sign the Ukraine-EU association agreement.”(Pifer, 
2014). Therefore, it is not Kosovo, but the attitude of the majority of the 
Ukrainian population favoring Euro-Atlantic integration, which has fueled 
Russian politics to destabilize this important country stretched between the 
West and Russia and to “discipline” the other countries with similar claims. 
Moscow does not wish to be surrounded by liberal democratic states, but 
by those with a leader like Viktor Yanukovych and others installed under 
Russian influence. Democratization of Russia’s neighbors will take place 
with difficulties, but “Ukraine’s partition—whether by vote or by force—
                                                 
2 Russia had voted UNSC Resolutions 1199 and 1244 on Kosovo, had participated in all 
stages of the negotiation process on Kosovo, in Rambouillet, in Vienna, in an attempt to 
achieve Serbian and Russian goals in Kosovo, ... had participated also in the process of 
establishing peace troops in Kosovo. 
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would not only result in a permanent breach between Ukraine and Russia, 
but could presage at civil war, ethnic conflict and even Russia’s possible 
disintegration (Bugajski, 2014). Not only Chechens, whose rebellion was 
crashed by Putin, will resist the Russian imperial mentality and supremacy 
in the East, but over 30 million non-Russians, mainly of Islamic faith, such 
as Tatars,3 Bashkirs, and Chuvashs will also seek their independence. 
Besides that, even Russians would not prefer the caste of oligarchs and 
corrupt politicians “thirsty for power who surround Putin” (Motyl, 2015). The 
Russian population would seek instead the democratization of their 
country, the collapse of Putin’s government, or even the dissolution of the 
Russian Federation. The expansionist ideology, Putin’s populism, and 
sanctions from the West will push Russia “from victory to victory until the 
final loss.” Putin’s annexation of Crimea and infiltration in eastern Ukraine 
were calculated (rationally by him) in the way that Ukraine is not of 
primary interest to the West as it is for Russia, and the West has no other 
choice than that of negotiation between war and acceptance of the 
situation. For that reason, Russia has decided to pay the price of its 
aggression, not necessary for the US to go to war on this issue (Rose, 2015). 
 
2. Following the Concept of Belongingness by Serbia and Russia—
Antithesis of Democratic Peace  
 
Almost every case of a state’s gaining independence is special. It is the 
result of emancipation efforts of peoples seeking freedom from states or 
regimes that have abused them or in extreme cases expelled them from 
their lands, which, in certain geopolitical and geostrategic circumstances, 
became part of such states and regimes. However, the origin, perceived 
causes, damages, and types of political crises that lead to radicalization are 
different. Following the end of Cold War, the compact Yugoslav territory 
                                                 
3 Number of Tatars from the second half of the 19th century fell apparently. It is known 
period of hunger 1921-22, when thousands Tatar starving. Now Tatars fear because once 
(11 May 1944) the regime of the SU deported (exiled) from Crimea two hundred thousand 
Tatars, who were ordered that within 15 minutes to collect no more than 500 kg 
elementary needs per family to gather certain points from which were deported to the 
depths of Russia, in Uzbekistan. See more at: Ann Sheehi, Bohdan Nahaylo, “the Crimean 
Tatars, Volga Germans and Meschetians: Soviet treatment of sonme ethnic Minorities”, 
London, 1980, p. 8. Soviet Russian politics did not differ from that of Tsarist. The 
peninsula's oldest residents are also the ones least keen on Russian rule. Here's why, New 
Republic, 2014  
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populated by Albanians was subject to ethnic cleansing, with more than 
half the population expelled from the country. Witnessing the genocidal 
tendencies of the Milosevic regime against non-Serb groups in the former 
Yugoslavia, the West drew lessons on the basis of which it intervened, 
placing Kosovo under international administration and leading a process of 
dialogue for almost ten years. 
Strict adherence to the sovereignty, integrity, and non-intervention 
against acts of extreme violence would produce a second Chechnya in 
Kosovo, a failure of human consciousness and the inability of democracies 
to spread liberal values in the world. Kosovo waged a peaceful struggle for 
a decade and an armed struggle for liberation on its own. NATO finally 
intervened in 1999, preventing human sufferings of proportions never seen 
in the region, but Albania did not. On the other side, Russia “helped” 
Crimea with about 16,000 soldiers to create conditions for holding the 
referendum. When Serbia was not satisfied with proposals on Kosovo’s 
political status, provided by international mediation that included Russia 
itself, Kosovo declared its independence, which so far has been recognized 
by 111 countries. Dialogue on normalization of interstate relations with 
Serbia, facilitated by the EU and supported by the United States, is taking 
place. Kosovo was cooperative with the international community, while 
Russia turned against international commitments. Moscow violated the 
deal reached with the United States and Britain in 1994 on respecting the 
territorial integrity of Ukraine in return for Kyiv’s giving up of its nuclear 
weapons. It also violated the agreement of September 2014, the ceasefire 
brokered by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President 
François Hollande. 
Kosovo’s recognition by the democratic world as a unique case 
“angered” Russian policymakers to demonstrate their power. They rushed 
to send indications of influence to former Soviet states and beyond, 
insisting that Moscow will not allow Western-type democracies in Russia’s 
vicinity. This means a return to the Cold War under new circumstances. 
Russian reaction followed immediately after the declaration of 
independence of Kosovo, intervening in support of pro-Russians in 
Abkhasia and South Ossetia, two territories of Georgia that became 
virtually independent in the early 1990s. In 2008, Abkhasian and South 
Ossetian independence were recognized by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, 
and Nauru. The same policy has created a large number of frozen conflicts 
as is the case of Transnistria and now Crimea and other parts of eastern 
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and south Ukraine, where the Russian population helped by Russia created 
the independent republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. 
This is a Concept of Belonging, in trend among similar regimes of 
Belgrade and Moscow toward parts of the former Yugoslavia and Soviet 
Union. The Concept of Belonging is heavily ingrained in the strategic 
thinking of Russian foreign policy, dictating Moscow’s ideological and 
strategic goals in regional and international developments. It is in the 
nature of peoples to care for their diasporas, but it is not ethically 
implementing different standards toward not-belongings. States and world 
orders undergo constant transformation. Turkey cannot claim that Serbia is 
part of it because Serbia was part of Ottoman Empire for hundred years. 
Serbia cannot claim that Kosovo is part of it because both were part of the 
inexistent, bloodily dissolved Yugoslavia.  
Putin has instituted aggressive policies of “considered Russia where 
Russians are a majority or in significant number” in Ukraine, regardless of 
the price he would have to pay. Aware that the West will not be involved 
in any fighting against Russia, Putin considers all options as rational4 in 
achieving its goals. Through regional hegemony, he intends to have free 
energy market corridors across the region, which are as important as 
owning the energy resources themselves.5 Putin goes beyond the 
annexation of Crimea, threatening Ukraine that it will be stable only if it 
“provides the rights and interests of Ukrainian Russians.”6 And as Nicholas 
Burns wrote, “Putin’s ambition is clear. He wants to dominate all the 
former Soviet states to Russia’s south and west in order to create a buffer 
zone that will insulate his authoritarian regime from the infection that 
might eventually destroy it—independent, free market, democratic 
governments.” (Burns, 2015). 
According to The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010. II, 8, 
a,b.(2010), not one external threat against Russia’s sovereignty is likely to 
be realized, even from NATO actions. Besides that, Putin is turning into 
                                                 
4 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Readout of the President's Call with 
President Putin of Russia, President Obama warned Putin if Russia continues its 
aggressive actions in Ukraine, including by sending troops, weapons, and financing to 
support the separatists, the costs for Russia will rise.  
5 See more at: The Ukraine Crisis Timeline, prepared by Center for Strategic International Studies,  
6 Kremlin, ‘Address by President of the Russian Federation’.  
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cause of the breakdown of the World Order of the Second World War,7 (re) 
construction of which will be very difficult and not without consequences 
for humanity. His way of ruling, based on territorial expansionism and not 
in the spirit of democratic peace, serves the political philosophy he is trying 
to impose on the actual international system. At the moment, the Russian 
president “is deliberately testing the limits of the system and wishes to use 
the resulting chaos and confusion to his advantage,” (Karásek, 2014), 
entering the stage of developing a dangerous revisionist superpower. 
Further, in the East, China with actions against its neighbors seems to be 
imitating Russia, making the existing international system even more 
uncertain, while they try to accommodate their internal despotism fueled 
with nationalism. 
Trends of pursuing Realpolitik and ignoring the paradigms of liberalism 
by those key international powers are dangerous to the coming multi-polar 
system and pose the risk of confrontation between the powers. 
 
3. Kosovo, false pretext of Russian hegemonic policy 
 
There are some third-hand similarities between Crimea and Kosovo 
cases: their political status held within former federations, their being 
transferred from one to another state, violent change in the population 
structure, and internationally unrecognized referendums. 
At the end of World War I, Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (renamed Yugoslavia in 1929). Only after 
World War II, did Kosovo gain limited autonomy within Yugoslavia/ 
Serbia, which was qualitatively enriched and impoverished with time, and 
then reduced to a nominal level under the Milosevic regime. Yugoslavia 
reached agreements with Turkey providing for the resettlement of 
Albanians to Asia Minor. On the other hand, a large number of Serbs 
moved in as settlers in southern Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, in order to 
change the population’s ethnic makeup in favor of Serbs. Such ethnic 
replacements were also implemented in the northern part of Serbia, 
                                                 
7 The international order "evident in the Charter of the United Nations itself, between the 
preservation of states’ territorial integrity and the protection of individual rights, 
including, in extraordinary circumstances, through the ultimate independence of 
oppressed populations in acts of self-determination…”See Burke-White, William W., 
"Crimea and the International Legal Order" (2014). Faculty Scholarship. Paper 1360 p. 2.]. 
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Vojvodina, replacing hundred thousands of Germans and Hungarians with 
Serbs and Montenegrins. 
Crimea became an autonomous republic within the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic. At the end of World War II, Soviet authorities 
deported Tatars, Greeks, Armenians, and Bulgarians from Crimea in order 
to change the structure of the population in favor of ethnic Russians. 
Former Russian military officers settled in the peninsula, transforming it 
into a predominantly Russian-speaking territory. Following Stalin’s death 
and the arrival of Nikita Khrushchev, a Russian from Ukraine, Crimea 
became part of Ukraine in 1954, a decision that was never challenged by the 
Russian Federation until 2014. 
The causes and reasons that led Kosovo to declare its independence and 
Crimea to join the Russian Federation are different:  
1. Yugoslavia practiced unprecedented crimes against humanity. 
Ukraine did not. 
2. Several UN Security Council resolutions condemned Yugoslav 
oppression against the Albanian majority in Kosovo. No similar 
resolution was adopted on possible violations against the Russian 
majority by Ukraine. 
3. Kosovo was part of now inexistent federation of Yugoslavia. 
Ukraine did not dissolve. 
4. In Kosovo, the international community intervened to save the 
people. Russia intervened to annex the territory. 
5. UN Security Council and UN Secretary General appointed Maartti 
Ahtisaari as Special Envoy to work on Kosovo’s future political 
status, after years of work by Kosovo and international institutions 
on implementing the democratic standards. No one intermediated 
in the Crimean case. 
6.   Kosovo institutions have guaranteed minority rights under 
international supervision. Crimea has not. 
7.   Kosovo’s path to independence was long, gradual process: 
a) Kosovo went through a decade of peacefully resistance. In 
Crimea, there was no strong movement for secession, 
independence, or unification; Russian annexation occurred 
within a month. 
b) Kosovo resisted the Serbian military, paramilitary, and police 
forces during the conflict. No conflict occurred in Crimea. 
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c) Mediated by international mechanisms, Kosovo followed a 
lengthy process of negotiations. In Crimea, there was no 
mediation to resolve a conflict. 
8.   Kosovo democratic institutions declared independence in close 
coordination with Western democracies. Crimea declared 
independence in haste, and neglected the international law. 
9.   Kosovo was under international administration and peacekeeping 
missions: the United Nation Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK, NATO-
led Kosovo Forces (KFOR), the International Civilian Office 
(ICO), and the European Union Rule of Law (EULEX) mission. 
Crimea was not. 
10. Kosovo did not become part of another state (i.e., Albania). 
Crimea was annexed by Russia. 
11. Kosovo’s declaration of independence was qualified by the 
International Court of Justice as an action in accordance with the 
International Law. Not one respectable internationalmechanism 
approved the annexation of Crimea. 
12. Kosovo’s independence was not qualified by the United Nations as 
a violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. The 
unification of Crimea with the Russian Federation was. (UN General 
Assembly Resolution. 2014. “Territorial Integrity of Ukraine.” Doc. 
A/68/L.39. New York.) 
13. Kosovo is recognized not only based on the right to self-
determination but also as a contribution to regional peace and 
stability. Who threatened peace in Crimea? 
14. Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo was transferred to the United 
Nations and only gradually handed over to Kosovo interim 
institutions and finally to internationally supervised institutions 
of independent Kosovo. Sovereignty over Crimea was abruptly 
assumed by Russia. 
15. Kosovo is recognized by 111 sovereign states worldwide. Who 
will recognize the annexation of Crimea by Russia? Authoritarian 
regimes, democracies? 
 
Comparison of the reasons that led to Kosovo’s independence with the 
causes of Crimea’s annexation is, in the words of Angela Merkel, 
“shameful.” It is inhumane or unethical even for the sake of the war victims 
Dr.sc. Samet DALIPI 
_____________________________ 
ILIRIA International Review – Vol 6, No 1 (2016) 
© Felix–Verlag, Holzkirchen, Germany and Iliria College, Pristina, Kosovo 
130 
in Kosovo to make comparisons between the two cases.8 Attempts to use 
Kosovo to justify Russia’s actions in Crimea are an unusually blatant 
application of false moral equivalency. (Somin, 2014). But there are a few 
scholars who believe that the West will pay the bill for the independence of 
Kosovo. A few authors “do not see” any difference between the two cases. 
In fact, they go as far as to see positivity in Crimea’s case because there was 
no bloodshed as it happened in Kosovo, whose independence, according to 
Parish, was a misstatement option (Parish, 2014). Russia’s nonaligment 
with the West on resolving the Kosovo conflict has not been without a 
strategic background, setting the stage for a self-fulfilling prophecy: “I 
warned you, now look.” To keep words instead, Russia and its policy of the 
facts distortion about the abuse of the rights of Russians in the Crimea to 
create a false case of violation of human rights. Such abusive facts of the 
Ukrainian authorities to the Russians in the Crimea are not found by the 
impartial commission.9 While in Kosovo we have witnessed all forms of 
physical and structural violence against the majority population, the 
Albanians. 10 Even if there was a proclaimed violation by the state of 
Ukraine, it does not entitle Russia to interfere in the form it did in Crimea 
to "prepare referendum", who had no opposite options11 as were those in a 
referendum in Scotland, pro or against separation from the United 
Kingdom, (UK). If Russian leadership is so generous, why we have cases of 
people who live in Russia (Chechens) that they were brutally violated by 
Moscow when demanded and fought for secession from Russia? 
Chechenian independence did not come into play, much less its union with 
any state outside Russia because of the stronger. Humanitarian 
intervention in Kosovo was "illegal but legitimate", it was a multinational 
intervention to stop ethnic cleansing and eradication of a compact Albanian 
                                                 
8 In Kosovo were around 12,000 killed, at “Kosovan death toll is its argument for 
independence”, (Telegraf, 2009). Approximately 20,000 raped women, see at: Lilja 
Arnlaugsdottir, IN THE NEWS – Still no recognition of Kosovo war victims of rape, 
Women for women, 2013. Around one million expelled from their houses, see at: Kosovar 
Refugees, May 1999, Volume 6, Number 5, Forced Migration Review, issue 6, 1999. 
9 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the 
Human Rights Situation in Ukraine of 15 April 2014. 
10 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, (2000). The Kosovo Report: 
Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (OUP, Oxford 2000), p. 186.  
11 Choice 1. Are you in favor of the reunification of Crimea with Russia as a part of the 
Russian Federation? Choice 2. Are you in favor of restoring the 1992 Constitution and the 
status of Crimea as a part of Ukraine? 
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population. This was not the case in Crimea. In contrary this was the case 
of preparation for the annexation by the aspirant, Russia.  
The intervention did not happen "to make Kosovo part of Germany or the 
USA… that of Crimea happened in order to return Crimea to Russia...and 
the other issue is that the Russian population was not threatened… These 
sorts of risks had existed in reality in Kosovo, but were inexistent in Crimea 
"(Altmann, 2014). Not one country participating in the military intervention 
in Kosovo had any pretensions to annex Kosovo. To "forget" Crimea, Russia 
went further, by promoting, organizing and supporting the Russian 
radicalized elements to the conflict inside the Ukraine with a significant 
percentage (but still minority) Russian. The act of annexation of the Crimea is 
similar to that of the case of "Kosovo’s voluntarily association to Serbia"12 
during the 1945 under Yugoslav martian law. 
Ukrainian division (Crimea annexation) by Russia is illegal based on the 
applicable international law, since the unilateral secession of Crimea from 
Ukraine is influenced by Russia's military assistance.13 In addition, the 
Crimea has not been the subject of decolonization, the division is not 
defined by the Constitution of Ukraine, its territory has not been occupied 
or annexed after 1945, secessionists are not "the people", and that 
separation is not the result of flagrant human rights by the government of 
Ukraine. (Stepanowa, 2014).  
                                                 
12 Military Administration, set on 8 February, 1945 by the Yugoslav authorities, in order to 
combat the Yugoslav contra-revolutionaries, of possible discontent Albanians, part of 
Yugoslavia but distributed in Kosovo, Macedonia and in Montenegro. In Prizren, on 8-10 
July 1945, was held Provincial Council Meeting People of Autonomous Province of 
Kosovo-Metohija, in point 6 of the agenda was the draft - resolution for the annexation of 
Kosovo - Metohija to Federal Serbia; a few days later, on 23 July 1945 the Federal 
Assembly on September 1, 1945 and then Serbian Parliament, adopted resolutions on 
Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia-Serbia, Kosovo issue was considered in formal and legal 
terms as closed. People who opposed the resolution seriously suffered from the Yugoslav-
Serb regime. See at: Sabile Keqmezi-Basha, reactions of national forces in Kosovo against 
the decisions of the Assembly of Prizren (1945).  
13 There are some circumstances when secession could be considered as legal: (1) when 
dealing with the peoples of territories which are the subject of decolonization; (2) if 
provided by national legislation of the country of origin; (3) when the territory inhabited 
by a certain people has been conquered or annexed after 1945; (4) secessionists should be 
"people"; (5) When the mother country flagrantly violates their human rights, and (6) 
when there is no other effective remedies under national or international law. At: Quebec 
case, 2 S.C.R. 217, para.123 (1998); Pellet A., Ellet A., The Opinions of the Badinter 
Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 EJIL 178. 
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In the case of Kosovo, at least two elements made it possible for Kosovo 
to declare independence, first, flagrant violation of the human rights of 
Albanians; and, second, secession came after spending all other effective 
means, as a remedy. Kosovo's secession from Serbia, recognized by many 
scholars as the "remedial secession" was the result of Serbian crimes against 
the Albanian population, the denial of the right to inner self-determination, 
the extreme political and legal marginalization of a population which was 
among the largest in the former Yugoslavia.  
While, intervention in Crimea was not humanitarian one, it was of 
strategic national interests of Russia to control the Black Sea region. 
Kosovo's independence is declared by the Assembly of democratically 
elected (without the participation of the Serbian Assembly Members) nine 
years after the administration and state building by international and 
national efforts, and after a negotiation process in stages brokered by 
international mechanisms, which in terms of international relations is 
called a sui generis case. While Crimea's transfer, from Ukrainian to Russian 
administration took five days after the referendum and without negotiation 
process, which is against international law, voted under military pressure 
by the Parliament and after forced to resign by prime minister of Crimea, 
Anatoliy Mohyliov (although supporters of ousted President Yanukovych), 
and replacement by Sergei Aksyonov. In this aspect, the political party with 
separatist aim from Ukraine, the Party of Russian Unity, at the last elections 
had won only 4% of seats in Parliament! (Interfaks Ukraine, 2010). 
At the time of the declaration of independence, Kosovo was not 
administered by Serbia but by democratically elected institutions of Kosovo 
and the UN mission while Crimea was under Ukrainian administration. 
The mandate of UN mission in Kosovo as peacekeeping and institution-
building derived from Security Council Resolution of the UN. This mission 
was established with aims to prepare the ground for Kosovo's political 
status, overseen by the states as part of the UN Security Council, 
supervised by international mechanisms such as Contact Group,14 OSCE, 
and NATO. Kosovo's declaration of independence was an act which, 
                                                 
14 The Contact Group had either come in three basic elements (three No) in which to base the 
future political status of Kosovo: No return to Serbian sovereignty, No partition of 
Kosovo, No union with other territories. See at: United Nations Security Council, (2005), 
“Guiding principles of the Contact Group for a settlement of the status of Kosovo”, document 
S/2005/709, New York. Letter dated 10 November 2005 from the President of the Security 
Council addressed to the Secretary-General, point 6.  
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according to the highest UN judicial body, the respectful International 
Court of Justice, was not in violation of international law. In the same way, 
Karasek sees some substantial differences between the two controversial 
cases: the Yugoslav province saw international military action only after 
years of brutal internal armed conflict (nowhere to be seen in Crimea); the 
intervention was not motivated by territorial claims (anyone recalls the US 
wanting to annex Kosovo?); the humanitarian intention may have been 
controversial but was manifestly not based on national affinity (where 
Russia talks of protecting “our people”, NATO talked of saving “people”, 
full stop); the intervention was multilateral and backed informally by the 
UN Secretary General (difficult to imagine in the present context); and, 
finally, the separation of Kosovo came about as an unwanted outcome not 
welcome by many (NATO members remains split over this issue). This list 
does not make the Kosovo intervention less controversial, but sufficiently 
explains how starkly it contrasts with the current Russian actions and 
rhetoric. (Karásek, 2014). Kosovo's independence is recognized not only on 
the principle of the right to self-determination but as a necessity and a 
solution that stabilizes peace and strengthens security in Europe and 
beyond. In addition to these distinguishing elements, Kosovo has 
embarked on a process of achieving reconciliation with Serbia, for technical 
and political aspects. UN authorities have not recognized the results of the 
referendum in the Crimea, except Russia and China’s abstaining in the UN 
Security Council, at General Assembly only 11 countries were in favor, 
currently following Russian politics.15 
Within few similarities, there is that of conditions within annexations of 
Kosovo from Serbia and Crimea from Russia happened. The formal legal 
acts undertaken in the period of military regimes established for this 
purpose (Serbia settled military regime in Kosovo, 1945) or with military 
presence just before the decision (Russia’s military presence with some 16 
thousand troops in Crimea, 2014).  
Internationally unrecognized referendums held in Kosovo and Crimea, 
present a similarity between, the results of which are known respectively 
from Albania and Russia and not by the world's democracies. While the 
                                                 
15 General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize Changes in 
Status of Crimea Region. Armenia, Belarusia, Bolivia, Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, 
Russia, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe, were states that vote pro Crimean 
referendum results. See discussions and the text of resolution of 27 March, 2014 from 
Canada, Costa Rika, Germany, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine. 
Dr.sc. Samet DALIPI 
_____________________________ 
ILIRIA International Review – Vol 6, No 1 (2016) 
© Felix–Verlag, Holzkirchen, Germany and Iliria College, Pristina, Kosovo 
134 
referendum in Kosovo (1991) lasted four days, in Crimea it was 
confidential without debate and the options that were placed on the ballot 
papers did not have a section where citizens would say "no" to union with 
Russia. The Putin’s political school is going to be applied by the Serb 
leaders, continuing to prevent the integration path of Kosovo into 
international mechanisms and try to turn Kosovo into a frozen conflict. 
Kosovo, slowly but surely, is being recognized by states (111 of them), 
various global and regional organizations, the annexation of the Crimea or 
the declaration of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not in a 
similar parameters and indicators with that of Kosovo.  
 
4. Russian realistic context and western support to Ukraine 
 
How to explain the fact that the act of annexation of Crimea 
accommodates only 58% of its population. What with others who do not 
feel comfortable inside the Russian state? Why should 17% not threatened 
Russians become threatening to Ukraine? Why different standard for 
Chechens, to whom are not allowed secession from Russia as Crimea was 
allowed to join Russia? For which double standards of the West speaks 
Russian leadership, which is applying the double standards inside the 
country and led by nationalist politics is turning the world into a war even 
more outrageous than that of after WWII? Russian action in the case of 
conflict with the Chechens and annexation of Crimea is based on the 
principles of realist paradigm, "I want to become powerful, so, what you 
can do", in an anarchic international environment, and not over the ethical 
principles of international relations. According to this principle, within 
authoritarian (and powerful) country a population which does not belong 
to the majority (ethnic, religious or racial) and that is involuntary part of 
that country had the possibility to be assimilated, disappear or deported by 
the decision makers and certainly have not the right to self-determination. 
To this kind of states coercing, beating, torturing of the certain ethnicities 
by the state is usual behavior and no one from outside have the right to 
care, even less to intervene to stop the violence. In such countries 
“dominance of informal influence” (Kimage, 2009), is wider spread norm of 
governance. Types of these countries do not want international norms, 
systemic rules within which they "have" the right to expand their 
territories, to annex part of another state because of the past, not to respect 
the right of another population or group which does not belong to the 
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majority of population. International law does not recognize a threshold of 
state violence or patience when to a people "the cup is filled" and ask for 
self-determination right. In these authoritarian countries there are not such 
kind of limits or do not provide in their law the right to self-determination, 
which is not the same to democratic states. In the UK it is allowed a 
referendum on secession if the Scottish people want it.  
In Crimea, violence did not appear (which was good), but the 
dissatisfied parties were silent (for now) in order to avoid the immediate 
conflict. Russia’s interference in Ukraine, occupying a third of its territory, 
undermining the work of the new government, and promoting 
ultranationalism among the ethnic Russian minority after the collapse of 
pro-Russian Yanukowich government, constitutes a serious challenge to 
the current international system after the Cold War. To overcome the East–
West disputes, “the Euro-Atlantic community should reconsider its overall 
stance towards Russia and contemplate more effective ways to retry its 
socialization into the system.” (Karásek, 2014). “What is being decided in 
Ukraine—the largest country in Europe—is whether the post-Soviet space 
will be allowed to free itself from a vicious cycle of inefficiency, corruption, 
violence and failed governments to build instead modern, open, democratic 
societies.” (Saakashvili, 2015). 
Russia’s intention, based on the Putin doctrine of the right to use 
military force to defend ethnic Russians in neighboring countries, is to 
reach its geopolitical and geostrategic goals based on the argument of 
power: 
• To hinder democracy in neighboring countries and likely beyond 
neighbors, or to exterminate aspirations of states around Russia 
toward political, security, or economic integration in international 
mechanisms; 
• To expand Russian territory and factorize Russians wherever they 
live; 
• To impose Russia’s regional hegemony, with greater claims based on 
Realpolitik and aggressive imperialism;  
• To divide (if possible) along the Dnieper river, to federalize or 
decentralize Ukraine, and to obstruct integration in Western 
mechanisms (following Bosnia’s model or imitating Serbia’s 
destabilizing efforts against Kosovo), but to avoid a new frozen 
conflict (as in the cases of Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, South 
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Ossetia, or Abkhazia) due to Russia’s interest in transporting energy 
through Ukraine; 
• To represent the West and its policies, for domestic consumption, as 
dangerous for Russia, and to detract public opinion from common 
internal problems; 
• To prevent, in the longer geostrategic terms, Ukraine’s access to the 
Black Sea and Azov shores (Russia may also seek to control the 
shores all the way to Moldova, thereby linking its territories with 
Transnistria and ruling the landmass between the Black and Baltic 
Seas, crucial for energy exports); 
• To support pro-Russian politicians in the Balkans, where pan-Slavic 
ideology, fatigue from the EU enlargement process, and bad 
governance (with rampant corruption and clientelism) provide better 
grounds for ties with Russia than the West; 
• To cause political and economic divisions within the group of EU and 
NATO, considering that trade between the EU and Russia is 10 times 
larger than trade between the United States and Russia. 
 
Putin and his oligarch class could face the Western determination to 
support and protect Ukraine in the economic, political, and military fields. 
Rebellion driven by the Putin politics in Ukraine will diminish through 
sustainable and strengthened sanctions, which will force Putin to rethink 
his aggressive imperialistic actions. Western consensus in the three areas of 
support would send positive signals to countries aspiring for Euro-Atlantic 
integration and for the expansion of democratic peace in this region ridden 
with democracy deficit. Such Western behavior sends a message to the 
Russian leaders that rules of the game cannot be changed by force. Possible 
negotiations should consider the demands of the Russian minority, forcing 
Ukraine to accept a decentralization of power (as in the case of Kosovo) as 
one of political solutions, but preserving without doubt the integrity of 
Ukraine as a whole. For this, Russia needs to reflect on respecting the 
territorial integrity of Ukraine. Otherwise, disastrous consequences for its 
economy will be inevitable.  
In the meantime Russian leaders will begin to behave rationally leaving 
behind pan-Slavic feelings for the good of humanity. 
Russia will challenge the westernization of Ukraine. According to realist 
thinkers (H. Kissinger, J. Mearsheimer), solving the Ukrainian crisis will be 
in form of mutual compromises—“great bargain”—by the West and Russia. 
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The parties will agree on Ukraine not being a NATO member, but will 
permit Kyiv to associate with civilian EU mechanisms and create any 
government by the will of its people. The compromise should make 
Ukraine a bridge between Russia and the West. The European Union’s 
“bureaucratic dilatoriness and subordination of the strategic element to 
domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine’s relationship to Europe 
contributed to turning a negotiation into a crisis.” (Kissinger, 2014). The 
United States and the EU “tend to believe that the logic of realism holds 
little relevance in the twenty-first century and that Europe can be kept 
whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law, 
economic interdependence, and democracy,” (Mearsheimer, 2014), but 
reality has shown that realism or Realpolitik paradigms will continue to be 
implemented in international relations disputes. 
There are justified reasons for the West to support Ukraine. The Western 
interest to promote democratic peace in this region with democracy deficit 
and threatened by an authoritarian country, such as Russia, is a 
contribution to world security. For reasons of ethics and peace, Ukraine 
agreed to surrender the military arsenal it inherited after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union: over 1,900 nuclear warheads, 176 intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, and 45 strategic bombers, (Steven Pifer, 2014), in this way, 
disarming Ukraine “facilitated” Russia’s annexation of its territories. The 
nuclear disarmament was done with U.S. intermediation. Ukraine 
contributed to peace missions around the world and according to the needs 
of international organizations and the Western countries. Russian 
misinterpreted election and referendum results. International observers in 
the previous elections, held on May 25, 2014, gave high marks to the 
process. Four of the top five presidential candidates, who were pro-
Western, won 77 percent of the votes (Steven Pifer, 2014). Probably, the 
West did little work to befriend Russia, which lost the Cold War; doing so 
is an important factor of preventive policy, resurrecting the mutual trust 
between hostile parties. 
In finding a solution for Ukrainian–Russian disputes, the process of 
negotiation and addressing the demands of minorities is crucial. Such a 
policy is being implemented by the West in the Kosovo–Serbia case, 
without bypassing Serbia in the process of integration and cooperation or 
leaving Belgrade with a sense of complete loss, as it happened with 
Germany after World War I. Kosovo is following the path and instructions 
of democracies to which it belongs. Alternatives are wrong choices. 
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More than half of world sovereign states (currently, May 2016, 111 states 
recognized Kosovo), including Western democracies, have recognized 
Kosovo’s independence. Kosovo is a sui generis case, unlike any other. 
Moscow’s expansionism, however, is based on its policy of Russian 
Belongingness—intervening in territories with ethnic ties to Russia. No 
similarities between Kosovo and Crimea exist, except for some third-hand 
ones. Putin’s policy of comparing Kosovo with separatist movements in the 
Caucasus and the annexation of Crimea is only a pretext, not based on 
reality, aiming for realization a buffer zone between Western democracies 
and Russia. 
Putin and his oligarch class could face the Western determination to 
support and protect Ukraine in the economic, political, and military fields. 
Rebellion driven by the Putin politics in Ukraine will diminish through 
sustainable and strengthened sanctions, which will force Putin to rethink 
his aggressive imperialistic actions. Western consensus in the three areas of 
support would send positive signals to countries aspiring for Euro-Atlantic 
integration and for the expansion of democratic peace in this region ridden 
with democracy deficit. Such Western behavior sends a message to the 
Russian leaders that rules of the game cannot be changed by force. Possible 
negotiations should consider the demands of the Russian minority, but 
preserve without doubt the integrity of Ukraine as a whole. For this, Russia 
needs to reflect on respecting the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Otherwise, 
disastrous consequences for its economy will be inevitable. 
Rationalist attitude by Russian leaders, leaving behind pan-Slavic 
nationalism and expansionist policies, in meantime allowing the spread of 
democracy even among Russia’s neighbors, is the best way to provide for 
security in the modern world system. 
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